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1 Introduction
This article considers a variant of a standard mechanism design problem.
There are n risk-neutral agents who have to make a collective decision q ∈
[0, 1]. The decision q = 1 is ex post eﬃcient whenever the sum of the agents’
valuations for an aﬃrmative decision is positive, whereas q = 0 is ex post
eﬃcient otherwise. The agents posses private information on their indepen-
dently distributed valuations. It is by now well known that ex post eﬃciency
can be achieved in such a problem with quasi-linear utilities, if the parties
can write a comprehensive contract ex ante; i.e., before they privately learn
their types (see D’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet, 1979, and Arrow, 1979).
In this paper it is assumed instead that ex ante the parties can only write
a simple (‘incomplete’) contract which merely consists of an unconditional
trade level q0 ∈ [0, 1].1 Can voluntary bargaining that starts after the parties
have learned their valuations lead to ex post eﬃciency, given that the ex ante
contract just specifies a default decision q0?
The impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) says that
given a non-trivial decision problem, in the case n = 2 ex post eﬃciency
cannot be achieved if q0 = 0 (which corresponds to no ex ante contract). For
n > 2, the impossibility result has been further strengthened by Güth and
Hellwig (1986).2 In contrast, here it is argued that ex post eﬃciency may be
achieved if q0 6= 0.
This paper is motivated by a major problem in contract theory. While
optimal complete contracts are often quite complicated, real world contracts
seem to be rather simple.3 One possible explanation is the fact that even
1In addition, the contract may specify a lump sum up-front payment.
2See also Rob (1989) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990).
3Cf. Hart and Holmström (1987) and Hart (1995).
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though simple contracts may often not be flexible enough to induce the first
best directly, they may be eﬃcient if they are renegotiated in a certain way
(cf. Huberman and Kahn, 1988). In particular, several recent papers have
shown that while the well-known hold-up problem can often be solved by
sophisticated contracts (see Rogerson, 1992), it may also be solved by simple
contracts that just specify a threatpoint for future negotiations, given that
the parties are symmetrically informed (cf. Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey,
1990 and 1994, Chung, 1991, Nöldeke and Schmidt, 1995 and 1998, Edlin,
1996, and Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996).4 This paper attempts to make a
first exploratory step directed at a generalization of these insights to the case
of private information.
The paper is organized as follows. The first result in Section 2 char-
acterizes decision rules that can be implemented if the default decision is
exogenously given by some value q0 ∈ [0, 1]. The second result shows that in
the case of identically distributed valuations, there is an easily interpreted
default decision q0, such that ex post eﬃciency can be achieved for any num-
ber n of agents. The third result shows that in the setting of Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983), ex post eﬃciency is always achievable if the default de-
cision is chosen appropriately. In Section 3 it is argued that this insight can
be folded back into a trading problem with ex ante investments to achieve
the first best in a hold-up problem with private information. The results
are further discussed in Section 4. All proofs have been relegated to the
appendix.
4This positive view of renegotiation has to be distinguished from the ‘renegotiation-
proofness’ concept in traditional complete contract theory, where the class of contracts
that can initially be written is not restricted. There, the fact that parties cannot rule out
renegotiation can only be harmful, since it imposes additional constraints.
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2 Voluntary bargaining under asymmetric in-
formation
Consider n ≥ 2 risk-neutral agents indexed by i ∈ {1, ..., n}. A collective
decision q ∈ [0, 1] has to be reached. If agent i receives ti dollars, his or her
utility is given by viq+ ti, where vi ∈ [ai, bi] denotes agent i’s willingness-to-
pay. The agents’ valuations vi are modelled as independent random variables.
Agent i’s valuation is distributed according to the commonly known distri-
bution function Fi(vi), which is continuous and strictly increasing on [ai, bi].
Let the corresponding density function be denoted by fi(vi). Assume that
the default decision is given by q0 ∈ [0, 1] ; i.e., there is an exogenously given
‘constitution’ (or a simple prior contract) which says that if the n agents
do not reach a diﬀerent agreement, the decision will be q0. Bargaining is as-
sumed to be voluntary, such that an agreement to choose q 6= q0 can only be
reached unanimously.
According to the revelation principle (cf. Myerson, 1982), any Bayesian
equilibrium outcome of any conceivable bargaining game among the n agents
can also be obtained as the equilibrium outcome of a direct mechanism in
which the agents report their types truthfully. Let v˜ denote the vector
of reports, (v˜1, ..., v˜n). A direct mechanism, [q(v˜), t(v˜)] , consists of a de-
cision rule q : Πni=1 [ai, bi] → [0, 1] and a transfer rule t = {ti}ni=1, where
ti : Πni=1 [ai, bi]→ R. It is assumed that a mechanism must satisfy the budget
constraint
Pn
i=1 ti(v˜) = 0 ∀v˜. The parties can accept or reject the mechanism.
If at least one party does not accept the mechanism, the default decision q0
is implemented. Otherwise the parties announce their valuations and then
the decision and transfer payments are determined by the mechanism.
Let Qi(v˜i) = E−i [q(v˜i, v−i)] denote the expected decision and let Ti(v˜i) =
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E−i [ti(v˜i, v−i)] denote agent i’s expected transfer, given that agent i reports
v˜i and assuming that the other agents tell the truth.5 If agent i tells the truth,
his or her interim expected utility is given by Ui(vi) = viQi(vi) + Ti(vi). For
a mechanism to induce truthful reporting, it must be incentive compatible:
Definition 1 A mechanism [q(v), t(v)] is called Bayesian incentive compat-
ible if and only if ∀i,∀vi,∀v˜i :
Ui(vi) ≥ viQi(v˜i) + Ti(v˜i). (1)
Given that the other agents tell the truth, condition (1) guarantees that
it is rational for agent i to also tell the truth. The following lemma, which
is a standard application of mechanism design techniques, provides a very
convenient characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms.
Lemma 1 A mechanism [q(v), t(v)] is Bayesian incentive compatible if and
only if Qi(vi) is non-decreasing for all i and ∀i,∀vi, ∀v˜i :
Ui(vi) = Ui(v˜i) +
Z vi
v˜i
Qi(vˇi)dvˇi.
In particular, the lemma says that in a Bayesian incentive compatible
mechanism the interim expected utility Ui(vi) of agent i is uniquely deter-
mined (up to an integration constant) by the decision rule. Bargaining is vol-
untary, hence each agent can refuse to participate in the mechanism. Since
non-participation of an agent leads to the decision q0 which can also be pre-
scribed by the mechanism itself, there is no loss of generality by restricting
attention to mechanisms in which all types participate.6
5As usual, (v˜i, v−i) denotes the vector (v1, ..., vi−1, v˜i, vi+1, ..., vn) and E−i is the ex-
pectation operator with respect to v−i = (v1, ..., vi−1, vi+1, ..., vn).
6Note that in general this would not necessarily be the case if (instead of an ex ante
fixed q0) one of the parties were given the right to choose q0 ex post (cf. Klibanoﬀ and
Morduch, 1995).
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Definition 2 A mechanism [q(v), t(v)] is called interim individually rational
if and only if ∀i, ∀vi :
Ui(vi) ≥ q0vi. (2)
The case that has received most attention in the literature is given by
q0 = 0. In this case, participation of the lowest possible type (i.e., Ui(ai) ≥ 0
∀i) is necessary and suﬃcient for (2). If q0 = 0, the type ai is the type that is
worst-oﬀ from participating in a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism,
because Ui(vi) is a non-decreasing function (see Lemma 1). The following
lemma generalizes this idea to the present setting where q0 6= 0 is possible.
Lemma 2 A Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism [q(v), t(v)] is interim
individually rational if and only if ∀i
Ui(v0i ) ≥ q0v0i ,
where agent i’s worst-oﬀ type v0i is characterized by
v0i =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
ai if q0 ≤ Qi(ai)
w(q0) if Qi(ai) < q0 ≤ Qi(bi)
bi if q0 > Qi(bi),
where w(q0) satisfies q0 = Qi(w(q0)).
Note that with q0 6= 0, the lowest possible valuation does no longer need
to be the worst-oﬀ type. For instance, if q0 = 1, an agent with the highest
possible valuation can lose the most from participating in the mechanism.
The following proposition provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
a mechanism to be incentive compatible and individually rational, provided
the exogenous default decision is given by q0 ∈ [0, 1].
6
Proposition 1 Let q(v) be a decision rule such that Qi(vi) is non-decreasing
for all i. There exists a transfer rule t(v) such that [q(v), t(v)] is a Bayesian
incentive compatible and interim individually rational mechanism if and only
if
nX
i=1
ÃZ bi
v0i
µ
vi −
1− Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
¶
Qi(vi)fi(vi)dvi
+
Z v0i
ai
µ
vi +
Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
¶
Qi(vi)fi(vi)dvi
!
≥
nX
i=1
q0v0i . (3)
It may be useful to take a closer look at condition (3) . The term on the
left hand side is the sum of all agents’ interim expected utilities, given that
they participate in a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism and provided
they are of their worst-oﬀ types. Consider the case q0 = 0. Then v0i = ai,
and condition (3) becomes7
nX
i=1
E
∙µ
vi −
1− Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
¶
q(v)
¸
≥ 0.
If there were no private information, any q(v) such that
Pn
i=1 viq(v) ≥ 0
could obviously be part of an interim individually rational mechanism. In
the presence of private information, this condition has to be expressed in ex-
pected values and modified such that the true valuation vi is replaced by the
term vi− 1−Fi(vi)fi(vi) , which is known as agent i’s ‘virtual valuation’.
8 It reflects
the distortion introduced due to the fact that the agents must be induced to
report their valuations honestly. If the mechanism failed to account for this
incentive eﬀect, the agents were tempted to understate their valuations (in
7This condition is known from Güth and Hellwig (1986) and Mailath and Postlewaite
(1990).
8The ‘virtual valuation’ (cf. Myerson, 1981) appears in many related models where
agents have private information about their willingness-to-pay. See Bulow and Roberts
(1989) for an interesting economic interpretation of ‘virtual valuations’ and ‘virtual costs’.
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other words, bias their reports towards the worst-oﬀ type, i.e., the lowest pos-
sible valuation, in order to decrease their payments). Analogously, in models
in which agents have private information about their costs,9 the ‘virtual costs’
term vi +
Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
appears (where the true costs are given by vi), reflecting the
fact that one must induce agents not to overstate their costs (the agents want
to pretend to be of the worst-oﬀ type, i.e., have the highest possible costs, in
order to receive a large compensation). In the present model, the incentives
to understate and to overstate may be balanced, since with a default decision
0 < q0 < 1, the worst-oﬀ type can occur at an intermediate valuation.10
It is worth noting that the proposition above applies to any decision rule
q such that Qi is increasing for all i. There is one such decision rule which is
of particular interest, namely the rule which maximizes total surplus.11
Definition 3 The ex post eﬃcient decision rule q∗(v) is given by
q∗(v) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if
Pn
i=1 vi ≥ 0
0 otherwise.
(4)
Hence, ex post eﬃciency can be achieved whenever (3) holds, where
Qi(vi) = E−i(q∗(v)).
9For example, see Rob (1989).
10Hence, there may be ‘countervailing incentives’ in the sense of Lewis and Sappington
(1989) and Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1995).
11Of course, the ex post eﬃcient decision rule is not the only one which has received
attention in the literature. For example, Rob (1989) analyzes the problem of a firm that
must decide whether or not to build a polluting plant. The aﬀected residents are entitled
to maintain the status quo (q0 = 0; i.e., ‘clean air’). He assumes that the firm has all
bargaining power and hence considers the decision rule which maximizes the firm’s profit.
Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) consider a public good problem and analyze the decision
rule which maximizes the probability of provision. Proposition 1 can be applied to any
such decision rule in order to check how robust the results are when the default decision
is diﬀerent from zero.
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While Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) showed that private informa-
tion may render ex post eﬃciency unattainable, Rob (1989) and Mailath and
Postlewaite (1990) suggest that in the case of many agents private informa-
tion even leads to complete inertia; i.e., a move away from the status quo
cannot be achieved without coercion. However, these negative results cru-
cially depend on the implicit assumption that the default decision is given
by q0 = 0. If q0 lies in the interior of the unit interval, there are non-trivial
situations in which even ex post eﬃciency can be achieved for any number n
of agents, as the following proposition illustrates.
Proposition 2 Consider the case Fi = F ∀i and let the default decision
be given by q0 = Pr
nP
j 6=i vj ≥ 0
o
. Then there exists a Bayesian incentive
compatible, interim individually rational and ex post eﬃcient mechanism.
Note that the default decision q0 specified in the proposition has a straight-
forward interpretation. The default decision is such that if agent i does not
participate, then he or she expects the decision to be what is eﬃcient for the
n − 1 other agents; i.e., when agent i’s preferences are simply disregarded.
In this case, each agent is better oﬀ when he or she participates and in this
way ex post eﬃciency can be achieved.
Proposition 2 is closely related to the eﬃciency result of Cramton, Gib-
bons, and Klemperer (1987). They also consider n agents with identically
distributed valuations. However, their analysis concerns the dissolution of
partnerships. Specifically, they show that ex post eﬃciency can be achieved
if initially every agent holds a certain share of a good, when it is ex post
eﬃcient that only one agent possesses 100% of the good (namely, the agent
with the highest valuation). Therefore, while they consider a private good
setting, Proposition 2 illustrates that a result in a similar spirit can also be
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obtained in a public good setting, in which every agent must ‘consume’ the
same amount q.12
In Section 3 a possible interpretation of endogenously chosen default de-
cisions q0 (namely, simple prior contracts) will be discussed in the framework
of the hold-up problem. The following result will be particularly important
for this discussion. Consider the bilateral trading problem of Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983); i.e. there is a buyer who is interested in a good that
can be provided by a seller. Formally, let v1 denote the buyer’s valuation and
−v2 the seller’s costs. The following proposition says that one can always
find a level of trade q0 such that ex post eﬃciency can be achieved.
Proposition 3 It is always possible to find a default decision q0 in the bi-
lateral trading problem such that a Bayesian incentive compatible, interim
individually rational and ex post eﬃcient mechanism exists.
The key step in the proof is to choose q0 such that if both agents are of
their worst-oﬀ types, the gains from trade are zero. Note that in non-trivial
situations this condition is violated for q0 = 0, where the gains from trade
are a1 + a2 if the parties are of their worst-oﬀ types. If the trade decision
is non-trivial, then the buyer’s smallest possible valuation a1 is smaller than
the seller’s largest possible cost, −a2, so that a1 + a2 < 0. However, using
Lemma 2, one can show with an intermediate value argument that there
always exists a q0, such that the worst-oﬀ types satisfy v01 + v02 = 0. Some
technical work is then needed to show that the sum of the agents’ expected
utilities given that they are of their worst-oﬀ types is non-negative.
Proposition 3 is also related to Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987).
A significant diﬀerence is that here the distributions are not required to be
12See also Neeman (1999) for a related model that has been independently developed.
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identical, even the supports can be diﬀerent. In the application presented in
the next section it is important to allow diﬀerent distributions, since there
the distributions are determined endogenously. Moreover, Proposition 3 is
related to McAfee (1991). However, there only ex ante budget balance is
required (i.e., there is a third party acting as budget balancer), and the
ex post eﬃcient trade decision q∗ must be characterized by a first order
condition, which here (and in Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983) is not the
case.13
3 An application to the hold-up problem
The hold-up problem has received considerable attention in the contract the-
oretic literature in recent years. A hold-up problem occurs if prior to a trade
decision, the gains from trade can be enhanced by relationship specific in-
vestments. As has been pointed out in the introduction, there are several
recent papers that show for the case of observable valuations that the first
best may not only be achieved by sophisticated contracts, but also by simple
contracts when they are renegotiated in a certain way. It has been shown by
Konakayama, Mitsui and Watanabe (1986), Rogerson (1992) and Hermalin
and Katz (1993) that comprehensive contracts can even implement the first
best if the parties’ valuations are private information. Hence, it is an inter-
esting question to ask whether in this case it is also possible to achieve the
first best with simple unconditional contracts which are renegotiated.
Assume first that there are no investments to be made. From Proposition
3 it is known that the parties can write a simple contract that just specifies an
13See also McAfee and Reny (1992), who show that ex post eﬃciency may be achieved
if the buyer’s valuation and the seller’s costs are correlated, provided that there is a third
party acting as budget breaker.
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unconditional trade level q0, such that negotiations starting after the buyer
and the seller have learned their types can lead to ex post eﬃciency. One
can think of these negotiations as if a mechanism were proposed by a third
party that aims to achieve ex post eﬃciency.14 While some technical work is
needed in order to make this precise, it is not diﬃcult to see that under the
assumption that renegotiation leads to ex post eﬃciency (when possible), also
the right investment incentives are provided, given that a party’s investment
only influences his or her own type.15 Intuitively, the reason is that a party’s
ex ante expected utility from an ex post eﬃcient mechanism is (up to a
constant) equal to the total expected surplus, so that each party is residual
claimant on the margin from his or her point of view.
To be precise, consider the following situation. A buyer and a seller write
a simple contract at date 0, that merely specifies an unconditional level of
trade, q0 ∈ [0, 1]. At date 1, the buyer and the seller make unobservable
relationship-specific investments e1 ≥ 0 and e2 ≥ 0, respectively. The buyer’s
valuation v1 and the seller’s costs −v2 are determined by their investments
and the state of the world, which is realized at date 2. Let vi be distributed
according to the continuous density function fˆi(vi|ei), which is strictly posi-
tive on the interior of [ai, bi], and let the corresponding distribution function
be denoted by Fˆi(vi|ei). The realizations of the stochastically independent
random variables v1 and v2 are private information of the buyer and the
14It has been pointed out by Tirole (1992, 1994) that renegotiation is a particular form
of collusion, since renegotiation can be viewed as collusion among future incarnations of
agents against their current incarnations. Renegotiation here is modelled in the same way
as collusion under private information is now usually being modelled, namely by employing
an uninformed third party as mechanism designer (see Laﬀont and Martimort, 1997 and
1998, and Laﬀont and Rochet, 1997).
15Hence, investments are ‘selfish’ in the sense of Che and Hausch (1999).
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seller, respectively. At date 3, the initial contract may be renegotiated. Fi-
nally, trade can occur and payments can be made at date 4.
Let Ci(ei) denote party i’s cost function for the investment. Let q ∈ [0, 1]
denote the probability (or level) of trade and t2 ≡ −t1 the (possibly negative)
net payment of the buyer to the seller. The utilities of the buyer and the
seller after date 4 are given by
uB = qv1 + t1 − C1(e1)
uS = qv2 + t2 − C2(e2).
At date 0 the parties want to design a contract which implements the ex post
eﬃcient trade decision
q∗(v) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if v1 ≥ −v2
0 otherwise
as well as the ex ante eﬃcient investment levels:
Definition 4 The ex ante eﬃcient investment levels e∗1 and e∗2 are given by
e∗i ∈ argmaxei
¡
E
£
(v1 + v2)q∗(v)
¯¯
ei, e∗−i
¤
− Ci(ei)
¢
.
For simplicity it is assumed that the ex ante eﬃcient investment levels
e∗1 and e∗2 are uniquely determined. Let Fi(vi) ≡ Fˆi(vi|e∗i ) and fi(vi) ≡
fˆi(vi|e∗i ), i = 1, 2.
In order to model the renegotiation game at date 3, it is assumed that a
mediator who is interested in achieving ex post eﬃciency proposes a direct
mechanism [q(v˜), t(v˜)] . The parties can either accept or reject this mecha-
nism. If at least one party does not accept the renegotiation mechanism, the
original contract remains valid; i.e., the default decision q0 is implemented.
Otherwise the parties announce their valuations and then the decision and
transfer payments are determined by the renegotiation mechanism.
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I say that “the first best can be achieved with a simple contract and
renegotiation” if there exists a default decision q0 and a mechanism [q(v), t(v)]
which yields the ex post eﬃcient decision q∗(v) and induces the parties to
choose the ex ante eﬃcient investment levels e∗1 and e∗2.
The following lemma says that in an incentive compatible and ex post eﬃ-
cient mechanism, agent i’s interim expected utility equals the total expected
surplus plus or minus a constant which does not depend on his or her type.16
In the lemma it is assumed that each agent believes that the other agent has
invested eﬃciently, so that E−i is the expectation operator associated with
the distribution function F−i and Ti(v˜i) is defined as in Section 2.
Lemma 3 A renegotiation mechanism [q(v), t(v)] is Bayesian incentive com-
patible and ex post eﬃcient if and only if q(v) = q∗(v) and ∀i, ∀v,∀v˜i :
Ti(vi)− Ti(v˜i) = E−i [v−i (q∗(v)− q∗(v˜i, v−i))] (5)
This lemma can now be used in order to show that indeed an ex post
eﬃcient and incentive compatible renegotiation mechanism induces the right
investment incentives.
Lemma 4 Let [q∗(v), t(v)] be a renegotiation mechanism such that (5) is sat-
isfied. Then the agents are induced to choose the ex ante eﬃcient investment
levels e∗1 and e∗2.
Intuitively, in a Bayesian incentive compatible and ex post eﬃcient mech-
anism, each agent is residual claimant from his or her point of view. Hence,
it is in the interest of each agent not only to tell the truth, but also to invest
eﬃciently. This is true since an agent’s investment only influences his or her
own type, and not the type of other agents (cf. Rogerson, 1992). It is now
possible to state the following result.
16See D’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979).
14
Proposition 4 The first best can be achieved with a simple contract and
renegotiation.
Two remarks have to be made. First, the fact that there exists a bargain-
ing game such that the first best is achieved does not guarantee that in real
life contractual parties will actually always play this particular game. The
mechanism design approach taken in this paper only allows to look for an up-
per bound on the achievable surplus. There is no obvious way how to model
contract renegotiation. Even if there is no private information, there are sev-
eral competing approaches. Some authors use an axiomatic approach such as
the Nash bargaining solution, while others prefer a non-cooperative bargain-
ing model. Some authors argue that the parties can design the renegotiation
game, while others think it should be exogenously given. Of course, in the
presence of private information, analogous considerations could be made.17
Second, it is not claimed that the renegotiation mechanism is in itself
‘renegotiation-proof’ with respect to further negotiations. Assume that a
party refuses to participate in the renegotiation mechanism proposed by the
third party. Then the original contract would remain valid. Since q0 ∈ (0, 1)
is ex post ineﬃcient with probability 1, one could imagine that this would
not be the end of the game. However, this is a general problem of models in
which renegotiation is modelled as a non-cooperative game, even if there is
no private information. For example, renegotiation is often modelled so that
one of the two contractual parties can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the
other party.18 However, the “or-leave-it” threat is usually ineﬃcient. Hardly
17Cf. also Dewatripont and Maskin (1990) and the literature cited there.
18See Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) or Ma (1994). Hart (1995, p. 77) considers the case in
which each party can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer with probability 12 , which corresponds
to the Nash bargaining solution.
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anything may be implementable if no ineﬃcient threats in the renegotiation
game are allowed.19
4 Conclusion
In Section 2 it has been shown that the presence of private information does
not necessarily imply that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision
cannot yield an ex post eﬃcient outcome. The impossibility results of the
literature initiated by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) may be too pes-
simistic if the default decision is non-trivial. In Section 3 this result has been
applied to the hold-up problem. It has been argued that a simple contract
which is renegotiated may lead to the first best, even if the parties’ valu-
ations are private information. This is well in line with a large number of
recent papers which have proved similar results for the case of observable
valuations.
Notice that if the decision is whether or not to trade one unit of an
indivisible good, then 0 < q0 < 1 means that the original contract has to
specify randomization.20 It is interesting to note that related results have
been obtained for quite diﬀerent reasons in hold-up models with observable
valuations. In order to prove their well-known ineﬃciency result, Hart and
Moore (1988) implicitly assume that no trade (q0 = 0) is the only possible
default decision. In a modification of their model, Aghion, Dewatripont and
Rey (1990, 1994) explicitly allow randomization (0 < q0 < 1) as default
19Cf. Proposition 1 in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1992).
20Using a simple model with uniform distributions and no investments, Schmitz (1998)
discusses a coalition contract between two political parties in Germany which specifies
randomization in case of disagreement.
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decision and show that then the first best can be achieved.21 While in these
models an intermediate value of q0 serves to adjust the threat point in a
Nash bargaining game, in the present model an intermediate value of q0
is advantageous because it relaxes the interim participation constraints (cf.
Section 2). In any case, as has been pointed out by Edlin and Reichelstein
(1996, p. 494), a contract to trade half a table might well be eﬃcient, even
though it is only eﬃcient ex post to trade a whole table or nothing.
The paper suggests several interesting avenues for future research. First,
Section 2 has illustrated that default decisions are relevant even if there
are no investments. Indeed, it has been pointed out by Hart (1995) and
Moore (1992) that the hold-up problem is only one vehicle for their theory
of property rights. Given private information, one may analyze the eﬀects
of diﬀerent ownership structures (control rights over q) and try to relate
them to insights gained in models with investment decisions but observable
valuations. Second, it has been assumed that agent i’s investment only in-
fluences his or her own valuation vi. In the case of observable valuations,
Che and Hausch (1999) have recently analyzed the eﬀects of ‘cooperative
investments’; i.e., investments which have direct external eﬀects on the val-
uations of other agents. It would be interesting to analyze what happens if
private information is introduced into their model.22 Finally, in this paper
a mechanism design approach has been used in order to investigate what
21Analogously, Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) argue that the first best can be achieved
in Rogerson’s (1984) model. While Rogerson (1984) considered deterministic default de-
cisions only, Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) allow the initial contract to specify trade with
a certain probability.
22In a first attempt to address this question, Schmitz (2002) shows that in this case
there is in general no hope to achieve the first best, even if comprehensive contracts can
be written and renegotiation can be ruled out.
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could be the best possible outcome of contract renegotiation under private
information. Of course, in real life there often is no benevolent mediator
who proposes a renegotiation mechanism to the contractual parties. It is an
open question for future research what happens if renegotiation is modelled
by a generalization of the Nash bargaining solution for bargaining problems
with incomplete information (see Myerson, 1984) or by exogenously given
non-cooperative bargaining games.23
23See also Farrell and Gibbons (1995). Note, however, that their focus is on adverse
selection (precontractual information at the ex ante stage) and not on hidden information
(private information at the ex post bargaining stage).
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Appendix
A1. Proof of Lemma 1.
(i) “Only if”: (1) implies
Ui(vi) = viQi(vi) + Ti(vi) ≥ viQi(v˜i) + Ti(v˜i)
Ui(v˜i) = v˜iQi(v˜i) + Ti(v˜i) ≥ v˜iQi(vi) + Ti(vi).
Hence, (vi − v˜i)Qi(vi) ≥ Ui(vi) − Ui(v˜i) ≥ (vi − v˜i)Qi(v˜i), which implies
(vi − v˜i)(Qi(vi) − Qi(v˜i)) ≥ 0; i.e., Qi(vi) is non-decreasing, and U 0i(vi) =
Qi(vi) a.e., so that
Ui(vi) = Ui(v˜i) +
Z vi
v˜i
Qi(vˇi)dvˇi.
(ii) “If”: Using the condition of the lemma, the definition of Ui(v˜i), and
partial integration one finds
Ui(vi)− viQi(v˜i)− Ti(v˜i)
= Ui(v˜i) +
Z vi
v˜i
Qi(vˇi)dvˇi − viQi(v˜i)− Ti(v˜i)
= (v˜i − vi)Qi(v˜i) +
Z vi
v˜i
Qi(vˇi)dvˇi
= vi (Qi(vi)−Qi(v˜i))−
Z vi
v˜i
vˇiQ0i(vˇi)dvˇi
=
Z vi
v˜i
(vi − vˇi)Q0i(vˇi)dvˇi ≥ 0,
where the inequality follows since Qi(vi) is non-decreasing. Hence, (1) is
satisfied.
A2. Proof of Lemma 2.
Note that interim individual rationality is satisfied whenever Ui(vi)− q0vi is
non-negative for all i and all vi. According to Lemma 1, the first derivative
of Ui(vi) − q0vi is given by Qi(vi) − q0, which is non-decreasing in vi. If
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the first derivative is always positive or always negative, the minimization of
Ui(vi)−q0vi yields a corner solution, otherwise the minimum is characterized
by the first-order condition Qi (v0i ) = q0.
A3. Proof of Proposition 1.
(i) “Only if”: Using Lemma 1 and partial integration, one can write agent
i’s ex ante expected utility as
Ei [Ui(vi)] = Ui(v0i ) +Ei
"Z vi
v0i
Qi(vˇi)dvˇi
#
= Ui(v0i ) +
Z bi
ai
Z vi
v0i
Qi(vˇi)dvˇifi(vi)dvi
= Ui(v0i ) +
Z bi
v0i
Qi(vˇi)dvˇi −
Z bi
ai
Qi(vi)
Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
fi(vi)dvi.
Rearranging and using the definitions of Ui(vi), one finds
Ui(v0i ) = Ei
∙
Ui(vi) +
Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
Qi(vi)
¸
−
Z bi
v0i
Qi(vi)dvi
= Ei
∙µ
vi +
Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
¶
Qi(vi) + Ti(vi)
¸
−
Z bi
v0i
Qi(vi)dvi.
Summing over all i and using
P
iEi [Ti(vi)] =
P
iE [ti(v)] = E [
P
i ti(v)] = 0,
it follows that
nX
i=1
Ui(v0i ) = Ei
"
nX
i=1
µ
vi +
Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
¶
Qi(vi)
#
−
nX
i=1
Z bi
v0i
Qi(vi)dvi
=
nX
i=1
µZ bi
ai
µ
vi +
Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
¶
Qi(vi)fi(vi)dvi
−
Z bi
v0i
Qi(vi)
fi(vi)
fi(vi)
dvi
!
=
nX
i=1
ÃZ bi
v0i
µ
vi −
1− Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
¶
Qi(vi)fi(vi)dvi
+
Z v0i
ai
µ
vi +
Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
¶
Qi(vi)fi(vi)dvi
!
.
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According to Lemma 2, interim individual rationality implies that this ex-
pression must not be smaller than
Pn
i=1 q0v
0
i , which proves the first direction.
(ii) “If”: The goal is to construct a transfer scheme t(v) such that [q(v),
t(v)] is a Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism.
Define
ti(v) =
1
n
nX
j=1
ÃZ bj
aj
µ
vj +
Fj(vj)
fj(vj)
¶
Qj(vj)fj(vj)dvj
−
Z bj
v0j
Qj(vj)dvj − q0v0j
!
− 1
n− 1
X
j 6=i
ÃZ bj
aj
µ
vj +
Fj(vj)
fj(vj)
¶
Qj(vj)fj(vj)dvj
−
Z bj
vj
Qj(vˇj)dvˇj − vjQj(vj)
!
+
Z vi
v0i
Qi(vˇi)dvˇi − viQi(vi) + q0v0i .
Note that
Pn
i=1 ti(v) = 0 and
E−i [ti(vi, v−i)− ti(v˜i, v−i)] =
Z vi
v˜i
Qi(vˇi)dvˇi − viQi(vi) + v˜iQi(v˜i).
Thus,
Ui(vi)− Ui(v˜i) =
Z vi
v˜i
Qi(vˇi)dvˇi,
so that Bayesian incentive compatibility is satisfied by Lemma 1. Finally,
notice that
E−i
"X
j 6=i
ÃZ bj
aj
µ
vj +
Fj(vj)
fj(vj)
¶
Qj(vj)fj(vj)dvj
−
Z bj
vj
Qj(vˇj)dvˇj − vjQj(vj)
!#
=
X
j 6=i
ÃZ bj
aj
µ
Fj(vj)
fj(vj)
¶
Qj(vj)fj(vj)dvj −
Z bj
aj
Z bj
vj
Qj(vˇj)dvˇjfj(vj)dvj
!
= 0,
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where the last line follows from partial integration. Hence,
Ui(v0i )− q0v0i = v0iQi(v0i ) +E−i
£
ti(v0i , v−i)
¤
− q0v0i
=
1
n
nX
j=1
ÃZ bj
aj
µ
vj +
Fj(vj)
fj(vj)
¶
Qj(vj)fj(vj)dvj
−
Z bj
v0j
Qj(vj)dvj − q0v0j
!
=
1
n
nX
j=1
ÃZ bj
v0j
µ
vj −
1− Fj(vj)
fj(vj)
¶
Qj(vj)fj(vj)dvj
+
Z v0j
aj
µ
vj +
Fj(vj)
fj(vj)
¶
Qj(vj)fj(vj)dvj − q0v0j
!
,
which by assumption is non-negative, yielding interim individual rationality.24
A4. Proof of Proposition 2.
It is obvious that ex post eﬃciency can be achieved if trade is always eﬃcient
(a = ai ≥ 0) or if trade is never eﬃcient (b = bi ≤ 0). Consider hence
the non-trivial case a < 0 < b. Let Qi(vi) = E−i(q∗(v)) and note that
Qi(vi) = Pr
nP
j 6=i vj > −vi
o
. Notice that Qi(a) < q0 < Qi(b), such that
by Lemma 2 the worst-oﬀ type v0i is implicitly characterized by q0 = Qi(v0i );
i.e., Pr
nP
j 6=i vj > 0
o
= Pr
nP
j 6=i vj > −v0i
o
. Thus, the worst-oﬀ types are
given by v0i = 0 ∀i. Using partial integration, the left hand side of (3) can be
24Note that the special case of Proposition 1 which refers only to the ex post eﬃcient de-
cision rule could alternatively be derived following the approach of Makowski and Mezzetti
(1994) and Williams (1994).
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written as
nX
i=1
µZ 0
a
µ
vi +
F (vi)
f(vi)
¶
Qi(vi)f(vi)dvi
+
Z b
0
µ
vi −
1− F (vi)
f(vi)
¶
Qi(vi)f(vi)dvi
¶
=
nX
i=1
µZ 0
a
(vif(vi) + F (vi))Qi(vi)dvi
+
Z b
0
(vif(vi)− (1− F (vi)))Qi(vi)dvi
¶
=
nX
i=1
µ
−
Z 0
a
viF (vi)Q
0
i(vi)dvi +
Z b
0
(vi(1− F (vi)))Q
0
i(vi)dvi
¶
.
It is straightforward to verify that this sum is not smaller than
Pn
i=1 q0v
0
i = 0,
since Qi(vi) is non-decreasing and a < 0 < b.
A5. Proof of Proposition 3.
Consider the case a1 + a2 < 0 and b1 + b2 > 0 (otherwise it is obvious
that the first best can be achieved). Note that F1(v1) is strictly increasing
for v1 ∈ [a1, b1] with F1(a1) = 0 and F1(b1) = 1, and that F2(−v1) is strictly
decreasing for v1 ∈ [−b2,−a2]with F2(b2) = 1 and F2(a2) = 0. Since a1 < −a2
and b1 > −b2, a simple intermediate value argument shows that a unique
vˆ1 ∈ (a1, b1) ∩ (−b2,−a2) exists such that F1(vˆ1) = F2(−vˆ1).
Let q0 = 1− F1(vˆ1),which implies that 0 < q0 < 1. Notice that Qi(vi) =
E−i[q∗(v)|e∗−i] = 1− F−i(−vi). It follows from Lemma 2 that v01 = −v02 = vˆ1.
It will now be shown that there exists an ex post eﬃcient, Bayesian incentive
compatible mechanismwhich is interim individually rational given the default
decision q0. Referring to Proposition 1, it has to be shown that the following
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expression is non-negative:
2X
i=1
ÃZ v0i
ai
µ
vi +
Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
¶
Qi(vi)fi(vi)dvi
+
Z bi
v0i
µ
vi −
1− Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
¶
Qi(vi)fi(vi)dvi
!
−
2X
i=1
q0v0i
=
2X
i=1
ÃZ v0i
ai
(vifi(vi) + Fi(vi)) (1− F−i(−vi))dvi
+
Z bi
v0i
(vifi(vi)− (1− Fi(vi))) (1− F−i(−vi))dvi
!
=
2X
i=1
Ã
v0iFi(v
0
i )(1− F−i(−v0i ))−
Z v0i
ai
viFi(vi)f−i(−vi)dvi
+v0i (1− Fi(v0i ))(1− F−i(−v0i )) +
Z bi
v0i
(vi(1− Fi(vi))) f−i(−vi)dvi
!
=
2X
i=1
Ã
−
Z v0i
ai
viFi(vi)f−i(−vi)dvi +
Z bi
v0i
(vi(1− Fi(vi))) f−i(−vi)dvi
!
=
2X
i=1
Ã
−
Z bi
ai
viFi(vi)f−i(−vi)dvi +
Z bi
v0i
vif−i(−vi)dvi
!
=
2X
i=1
Ã
−
Z min{bi,−a−i}
max{ai,−b−i}
viFi(vi)f−i(−vi)dvi +
Z bi
v0i
vif−i(−vi)dvi
!
= −
Z min{b1,−a2}
max{a1,−b2}
vF1(v)f2(−v)dv −
Z min{b2,−a1}
max{a2,−b1}
vF2(v)f1(−v)dv
+
2X
i=1
Z bi
v0i
vif−i(−vi)dvi
= −
Z min{b1,−a2}
max{a1,−b2}
vF1(v)f2(−v)dv −
Z max{a1,−b2}
min{b1,−a2}
vF2(−v)f1(v)dv
+
2X
i=1
Z bi
v0i
vif−i(−vi)dvi
=
Z max{a1,−b2}
min{b1,−a2}
v (F1(v)f2(−v)− F2(−v)f1(v)) dv +
2X
i=1
Z bi
v0i
vif−i(−vi)dvi
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= −max{a1,−b2}F1(max{a1,−b2}) + min{b1,−a2}F2(−min{b1,−a2})
+
Z max{a1,−b2}
min{b1,−a2}
F1(v)F2(−v)dv − b1F2(−b1) + v01F2(−v01) +
Z b1
v01
F2(−v)dv
−b2F1(−b2) + v02F1(−v02) +
Z b2
v02
F1(−v)dv
=
Z max{a1,−b2}
min{b1,−a2}
F1(v)F2(−v)dv +
Z b1
v01
F2(−v)dv +
Z b2
−v01
F1(−v)dv
= −
Z min{b1,−a2}
max{a1,−b2}
F1(v)F2(−v)dv +
Z b1
v01
F2(−v)dv +
Z v01
−b2
F1(v)dv
=
Z v01
max{a1,−b2}
F1(v) (1− F2(−v)) dv +
Z min{b1,−a2}
v01
F2(−v) (1− F1(v)) dv
+
Z max{a1,−b2}
−b2
F1(v)dv +
Z b1
min{b1,−a2}
F2(−v)dv ≥ 0
The inequality holds since v01 ∈ (a1, b1) ∩ (−b2,−a2). Hence, the ex post
eﬃcient decision rule is implementable.
A6. Proof of Lemma 3.
(i) “If”: It has to be shown that ∀vi, v˜i :
Ui(vi) = viQi(vi) + Ti(vi) ≥ viQi(v˜i) + Ti(v˜i),
where Qi(v˜i) = E−i[q∗(v˜i, v−i)]. Equation (5) implies
Ui(vi)− (viQi(v˜i) + Ti(v˜i))
= vi (Qi(vi)−Qi(v˜i)) +E−i [v−i (q∗(vi, v−i)− q∗(v˜i, v−i))]
= E−i [(vi + v−i) (q∗(vi, v−i)− q∗(v˜i, v−i))] ≥ 0.
(ii) “Only if”: It has been shown in Lemma 1 that in every Bayesian
incentive compatible mechanism Ui(vi) − Ui(v˜i) and hence Ti(vi) − Ti(v˜i) is
uniquely determined by the decision rule. Since [q∗(v), t(v)] with Ti(vi) −
Ti(v˜i) determined by (5) is Bayesian incentive compatible, this implies that
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every Bayesian incentive compatible and ex post eﬃcient mechanism must
satisfy (5).
A7. Proof of Lemma 4.
Suppose that agent i believes that agent −i has invested eﬃciently and tells
the truth. It is already known from Lemma 3 that it is rational for agent i
to also tell the truth. The ex ante expected utility of agent i provided that
he or she invests ei thus reads
Ei[Ui(vi)|ei] = Ei [viQi(vi) + Ti(vi) |ei ]
= Ei
£
E−i
£
(vi + v−i) q∗(v)|e∗−i
¤ |ei ¤
+Ti(v˜i)− E−i
£
v−iq∗(v˜i, v−i)|e∗−i
¤
.
The last two terms do not depend on ei. Hence, agent i chooses ei in order
to maximize
E
£
(vi + v−i)q∗(v)|ei, e∗−i
¤
− Ci(ei),
so that he or she will invest eﬃciently.
A8. Proof of Proposition 4.
This follows immediately from Proposition 3 and Lemma 4.
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